Towards a Federated Identity and Access Management Across Universities by Alsulami, Jameel
PhD Dissertations and Master's Theses 
Spring 2021 




Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/edt 
 Part of the Digital Communications and Networking Commons 
Scholarly Commons Citation 
Alsulami, Jameel, "Towards a Federated Identity and Access Management Across Universities" (2021). 
PhD Dissertations and Master's Theses. 580. 
https://commons.erau.edu/edt/580 
This Thesis - Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in PhD Dissertations and Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For 
more information, please contact commons@erau.edu. 
i 
 
Towards a Federated Identity and Access Management Across 
Universities. 
 









A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Science in Cybersecurity Engineering  






















Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science  
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 




Towards a Federated Identity and Access Management Across 
Universities. 
 
by Jameel Alsulami 
 
This thesis was prepared under the direction of the candidate’s Thesis 
Committee Chair, Dr. Laxima Niure Kandel, and has been approved by the 
members of the thesis committee. It was submitted to the Department of 
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science in partial fulfillment of the 





Laxima Niure Kandel, Ph.D. 
Committee Chair 
 
 ___________________                               _________________ 
Houbing Song, Ph.D.                     Shafagh Jafer, Ph.D. 
Committee Member                     Committee Member 
 
________________________     _______________  
Timothy A. Wilson, Sc.D.     Date 
Chair, Electrical Engineering and Computer Science 
 
________________________     _______________ 
Maj Mirmirani, Ph.D.      Date 
Dean, College of Engineering 
 
________________________     _______________ 
Christopher Grant, Ph.D.      Date 








I am so grateful and thankful to ALLAH. I would like to take this opportunity to thank 
my family, my wife, and my children for their support and patience. I thank my advisor, 
Professor. Laxima Niure Kandel, for her encouragement and advice during my writing of 
my thesis, which has helped me reach this stage. I really appreciate who has supported 




















Table of Contents 
Chapter 1 Introduction. …………………………………………………………………...2 
1.1.Motivation. ……………………………………………………………………………4 
1.2.Methodology. …………………………………………………………………………4 
Chapter 2 Background. ……..…………………………………………………………….5 
2.1. Cloud Computing. ……………………………………………………………………5 
2.1.1. Cloud Computing Service Models………………....……………………….5  
2.1.2. Cloud Computing Deployment Models. …………………………………...6  
2.1.3. Security Issues in the Cloud Computing. ………....………………………..7  
2.1.4. The Benefits of Cloud Computing. ……………………………..………………….7 
2.2 Identity and Access Management (IAM). …………………....…………………….....8 
2.2.1 IAM Processes in Cloud Computing Environment. …….……………….....8 
2.3 Cloud Identity Management Models. ………………………....………..………….....9 
2.4. Access Risks in Cloud Security. …………...………………....…………………….11 
2.5. Literature Review. …………………………………………….…………………….11 
Chapter 3 Federated Identity. …………………………………....………………………14 
3.1 Introduction to Federated Identity. …………………………...……………………..14 
3.1.2.The CIA Triad in Federated Identity.……………………………………...14 
3.2.Trust Relationships in Federated Identity Management. ……….…………………...15 
3.3.Privacy in Federated Identity Management. ………………………………………...16 
3.4.Common Technology in Federated Identity. ………………...………………….......17 
v 
 
3.6.The OAuth 2.0 Framework. ……………………………....………....………………18 
3.6.1 OAuth Roles. ………...………………………...………………………….18 
3.6.2.Authorization Grant. ……………………………………....…………....…19 
3.7.Security Features of The OAuth2.0 Framework. …………………….…………...…20 
Chapter 4. ……………………….……………………………………………………….21 
4.1.The Proposed Approach. …………………………………………………………….21 
4.2.The Advantages of Proposed Approach. ………………….………………………...22 
Chapter 5. ………………………………………………………………………………..24 
5.1.Conclusion. ......……………………………………………………………………...24 















List of Figures 
Figure 1 Cloud Computing Deployment and Delivery Models. …………………………7 
Figure 2 IAM for Cloud Services. ………………………………………………………..9 
Figure 3 A Federated Cloud Identity Broker-Model. …………....……………………...10 
Figure 4 Cloud Bursting Galaxy Federated Identity. ……………..……………………..13 
Figure 5 Federated and Non-Federated Identity. …………………………....…....……..14 
Figure 6 Trust Relationships in Federated Identity Management. ……………….……...15 
Figure 7. The Differences between SAML, OpenID, and The InfoCard. …...………….18 
Figure 8 OAuth Roles. …………………………………………………………………..19 











Many research projects are too complex to yield the efforts of a single investigator and 
require a coordinated effort from interdisciplinary research teams across universities and 
industries. The research data, documents, experimental testbeds, high-end computing 
equipment, etc. is a critical component of any large-scale project and hence the 
cooperation and resource sharing across universities become very important for timely 
and budget-friendly execution of these projects. However, it is extremely challenging to 
frequently and effectively access data and other resources across universities without 
creating new identities for the users. In this thesis, we propose Federated Identity 
Management (FIM) approach for facilitating secure resource sharing among collaborating 
associates without creating new identities. We provide a comprehensive literature survey 
of identity and access management and discuss the privacy issues associated with identity 
management that can be addressed using FIM. We also provide a comprehensive 
overview and security features of the OAuth 2.0 framework which is an industry-standard 
protocol for authorization and user management used by FIM. The proposed scheme can 
be generalized and used by the student users to access academic libraries and recreate 
research results easily and securely. 
 
Keyword: federated identity management, OAuth 2.0, cloud computing, identity 





2. Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Collaboration among universities has the potential to yield multiple benefits. For 
example, collaboration could improve research results, lead to more resource gains, 
enhance problem-solving competence, etc. Due to a multitude of benefits, academic 
research is becoming increasingly collaborative. Many academics use research as their 
primary source of information. For academic papers, researchers must cite academic 
research to make arguments. Most researchers are working hard to discover new 
information and document it reliably. When researchers cooperate, their study could 
solve complex problems and ignite innovation and economic growth. Also, the 
collaboration between universities, researchers, and students has the potential to improve 
the dissemination of knowledge and teaching methods. In addition, collaboration with 
world-class education institutions could provide students the opportunity to learn state-of-
the-art research methods directly from experts in the field. Unlike a few decades ago, 
where data and technology sharing were not possible, due to the recent digital revolution, 
information and data sharing is easily accessible today. A great deal of information is 
nowadays available online and is accessible to everyone, at any time, and at any place-- 
thanks to the internet's accessibility and technological advancement.  
  
The technological advancement has also led to the migration of several traditional 
educational services to online modalities, recently. In online modalities, students are able 
to take tests and assignments and access libraries and lectures via the internet. During the 
recent Covid-19 pandemic, most institutes and universities moved the face-to-face classes 
to online, and lectures were delivered using the internet and technologies such as zoom, 
Microsoft teams, etc. The success and effectiveness of these new modalities relies on 
robust IT infrastructures of the institution. Thus, a strong IT infrastructure is the 
foundation of any university’s science, research, and educational activities (Pardeshi, V. 
H. 2014). However, due to the high cost of modern technologies, universities and 
colleges take a long time to deploy and use these methods. Since, moving to online 
modalities entails significant funding and expenditure and given the governments and 
private institutions' depleted budget reserves (Pardeshi, V. H. 2014), not all organizations 
can rip the benefits of new technological advancements. The shrinking IT budgets and 
escalating IT needs can be solved using the Cloud Computing (CC) platform as it 
provides on-demand, ubiquitous, practical access to computer systems. Thus, cloud 
computing environments have the potential to save higher education institutions from 
financial challenges by lowering the cost by means of hardware virtualization. It allows 
organizations to balance the capacity they need and pay as they go monthly for the 
services they use. Higher education institutions seeking to reduce IT costs can find 
solutions in cloud computing (Dillon, T., Wu, C., & Chang, E. 2010). In the last few 
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years, higher education is attempting to capitalize on the opportunities presented by CC 
in order to provide access to advanced IT infrastructure, data centers, and applications 
while mitigating associated security and privacy issues (Vaquero, L. M., Rodero-Merino, 
L., Caceres, J., & Lindner, M. 2008). The cloud-based IT infrastructure could contribute 
to the standardization and updating of educational content as well as the enhancement of 
cooperation and collaboration between higher education institutions (Pardeshi, V. H. 
2014). Although the CC-based services have advanced massively over the past years, the 
technology still has not fully matured and has many limitations. Particularly, when 
accessing the data on cloud-based platforms, private credentials of the user’s identity 
could be exposed putting the user's privacy and security at risk. Thus, authentication and 
authorization are needed for data access. 
 
As stated above, despite the multitude of benefits of sharing knowledge and resources, 
collaboration among multiple universities is not easy due to the complex intervention of 
multiple components. One major component is privacy and security issues because of 
which universities may not want to share their data even when the use and availability of 
data resources can benefit every research university. Universities may hesitate since 
dangers loom that the other stakeholders will exploit the shared data for personal and 
private needs. In extreme cases, the stakeholder may rob the technology, leave the 
collaboration, and threaten the survival of the other stakeholder that shared it. Despite 
these risks, collaboration is needed and sometimes required as the shared data could 
provide the needed background information about the subject and could aid in 
formulating the right research questions for collective good. Furthermore, sharing private 
research data and resources with other stakeholders can lead to the timely and budget-
friendly execution of large projects that could impact science, innovation, economic and 
workforce growth. 
  
To rip the vast benefits of academic collaboration and mitigate the limitations of privacy 
and security issues in the cloud (Indu, I., Anand, P. R., & Bhaskar, V. 2018), many 
organizations have adopted Identity and Access Management (IAM) systems. According 
to Gartner, "identity and access management is the discipline that enables the right 
individuals to access the right resources at the right times for the right reasons." 
Furthermore, the IAM systems provide protection to confidential information stored in 
the cloud enabling reliability and usability of customer access control imperative to any 
organization's sites. However, IAM is not a panacea, nor it mitigates all the privacy and 
security issues of the cloud. Also, universities may require different identities (or 
redundant identities) under the IAM scope. To address the problems of IAM, in this 
thesis, we propose federated identity management (FIM) as a means of identity access 
and management to enable the vision of academic collaboration. In this thesis, we 
particularly focus on academic collaboration; however, the technique can be generalized 
to other organizations or industries. The goal is to have many access credentials linked 
i.e., only one identity creation is under FIM. Single identity would allow users from one 
realm to securely access resources in another realm without the need for redundant 
logins. The user does not need to remember a long list of complicated passwords 
enhancing the user experience as well as security and privacy of the user identity. The 
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proposed method has a single interface that allows the user to access data and 
applications on different systems without different login credentials for each one. 
  
1.1.Motivation 
Academic collaboration is extolled as an important feature in the successful execution of 
large-scale research projects and for the understanding of complex systems (Hörbe, R., & 
Hötzendorfer, W. 2015). Despite the enthusiasm at the theoretical level, the 
implementation of collaboration among academic communities is not yet practical. One 
reason for this is the issue of trust and competitive nature among the stakeholders. Also, 
nowadays the universities host academic databases on commercial and institutional cloud 
computing platforms which magnifies the trust and security issues. To mitigate the 
security and privacy issues and authenticate the access of resources to legitimate 
stakeholders, we propose FIM-- a framework that aims to hide the identities and 
confidential information about the user and allows for collaboration within and across 
organizations using the single sign-in credential. We believe this method would allow 
easy collaboration and benefit many researchers and students. Students, under this 
framework, can securely access academic libraries and/or research data which would be 




In the first part of the research, we do an extensive literature review and provide 
background information about the federated identity and how it can benefit the academic 
community collaboration. Through extensive literature review, we examine past 
approaches and studies the theoretical background underlying IAM models, which in turn 
facilitated the identification of essential components that fit into our FIM architecture. 
Therefore, several methodologies used in our design are drawn on the contribution of 
researchers who have studied IAB. The second part of the research deals with the 
adoption of some recent and powerful technology such as OAuth 2.0 and OpenID 











2.1. Cloud Computing 
Cloud computing allows organizations to balance the capacity they need and pay as they 
go monthly for the services they use. Cloud computing is a model that enables 
ubiquitous, practical, on-demand network connectivity to a shared pool of configurable 
computing services that can be easily provided and even released with minimal 
management or service provider involvement. The Cloud computing model consists of 
five main characteristics, four deployment models, and three service models (Mell, P., & 
Grance, T. 2011). Cloud computing seeks to achieve the virtualization of resources and 
improve the overall computing capacity (Dillon, T., Wu, C., & Chang, E. 2010). Cloud 
computing has presented a brand-new standard that assists users in dynamically storing or 
developing applications and gaining access to them anywhere and even at any time by 
connecting to an application using the network (Vaquero, L. M., Rodero-Merino, L., 
Caceres, J., & Lindner, M. 2008). By offering computation, storage, and software-based 
services, cloud computing has obtained broad acceptance for organizations and 
individuals. Cloud Computing serves to solve the infrastructure shortage of consumers by 
offering pay-per-use applications on-demand. In cloud computing, cloud providers take 
responsibility and function to run software and hardware to promote performance. Cloud 
computing commoditization has resulted in a radical form of vertical disintegration, 
where physical infrastructure is unbundled from the platform layer and delivered as a 
service (Kushida, K. E., Murray, J., & Zysman, J. 2015). 
2.1.1. Cloud Computing Service Models 
A variety of service models are available to access cloud computing. These services are 
specifically intended to exhibit certain characteristics as well as satisfy organizational 
needs. An organization can select and customize one of the best-suited possibilities from 
the list below (Bulusu, S., & Sudia, K. 2013). 
 
-      Software as a Service (SaaS). 
This functionality is given to the customer to use the applications running on a cloud 
platform on demand. The consumer can use the software of the provider on a cloud 
infrastructure. Applications can be accessed from several client devices through a client 
interface such as a web browser. The consumer does not handle the underlying cloud 
infrastructure. 
-      Platform as a Service (PaaS). 
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The consumer has the capability to deploy onto the cloud infrastructure their developed 
or acquired applications created using the programming languages and tools provided by 
the provider. The consumer has control over which applications they install. 
-      Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). 
The customer has the capability to provide the processing, storage, networking, and 
software environments in which the consumer can run their applications. The consumer 
has some control over, can manage operating systems, storage deployed applications and 
possibly limited control of select networking components. 
 
2.1.2. Cloud Computing Deployment Models 
One or more deployment models can be used to deploy the service models explained 
above (Bulusu, S., & Sudia, K. 2013). The cloud deployment models are used to 
demonstrate how the cloud services are made available to users. Cloud computing is 
typically divided into four basic deployment models (Laszewski, T., & Nauduri, P. 
(2010). The following are explanations of each of these deployment models: 
1. Public cloud: All users who want to use a computing resource will use this type of 
cloud deployment model. Application development and testing, non-mission-critical 
activities such as file sharing, and e-mail service are the most popular uses of public 
clouds. This model is the first choice by businesses with low privacy concerns. 
2. Private cloud: This model is commonly used for a single organization's 
infrastructure. Acquisition and maintenance costs for private clouds are more costly than 
for public clouds. A private cloud is better to meet the security and privacy challenges of 
organizations. The private cloud model minimizes data security issues. The private cloud 
allows for more customization of the infrastructure to meet the needs of the company. 
The private cloud allows for more customization of the infrastructure to meet the needs of 
the company. A private model is perfect for companies who want to shield their mission-
critical operations or businesses with rapidly evolving needs. 
3. Community cloud: the only difference between a community deployment model 
and a private deployment model is the number of users. Access to a community cloud 
environment is usually limited to community members. Unlike a private cloud server, 
which a single organization owns, a community cloud is shared by many organizations of 
similar backgrounds. 
4. Hybrid cloud: A hybrid cloud is one in which an organization uses interconnected 
private and public cloud infrastructure. Hybrid cloud enables organizations to incorporate 
the aspects of the three models that better serve their needs. This model is commonly 




Figure 1 Cloud Computing Deployment and Delivery Models (Mell & Grance, 2011) 
2.1.3. Security Issues in the Cloud Computing 
The security field is a significant concern in cloud computing. Many organizations are 
hesitant to move their data to the cloud environment because there are many threats 
involved in handling sensitive data (Singh, A., & Chatterjee, K. 2017). The cloud 
environment is affected by threats and attacks. If Integrity, availability, and 
confidentiality of the cloud resources and service of different layers are breached, it could 
raise a new security concern (Singh, A., & Chatterjee, K. 2017). The key to effective 
security implementation in cloud computing is understanding where the service 
provider's responsibility ends and where the customer's responsibility begins (Dotson, C. 
2019). Cloud security is considered as a part of computer security. It defines a set of 
policies, technology, and control that helps secure the data and services. 
2.1.4. The Benefits of Cloud Computing 
The benefits of cloud computing have excited the attention of the information and 
technology community. Cloud computing technology is proving to be beneficial to many 
organizations and individuals as opposed to traditional computing methods. 
Organizations will focus on doing their research and development instead of thinking 
about patching security holes and coping with other computing problems. Organizations 
will have the ability to choose from several vendors that offer reliable, flexible services, 
development environments, and an infrastructure that can be leveraged with no long-term 
contracts. The most important advantage of cloud computing is cost saving. As it does 
not require any physical hardware investment, it allows organizations to save significant 
capital costs. Reduced cost due to operating efficiencies and quicker business services 
delivery. The organizations do not need substantial training to operate the hardware. The 
cloud service provider handles the procurement and maintenance of equipment. Cloud 
computing provides access to hundreds of applications at any time without the need for 
installation and configuration. Cloud Computing helps organizations to deploy their 
business quickly. Therefore, deploying rapidly helps in getting the resources needed for a 
framework. 
Data can be available on the cloud and be backed up and retrieved more comfortably 
from on-premises. Reliability is the most significant advantage of cloud computing. 
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Organizations always get updated about the changes instantly. Employees at workplaces 
or operating remotely will use all possible facilities accessible to them. Internet access is 
what they need. The cloud has nearly unlimited storage space. Organizations can easily 
extend your storage space with minimal month-to-month fees. The cloud computing 
platform allows employees to communicate instantly and conveniently regardless of 
where they are located. Cloud computing allows fast implementation by remote access. 
Organization whole systems will become operational in a short period. 
The overall cost benefits of the cloud are driven primarily by hardware obligations. If a 
virtual machine, a server, or an entire data center goes down in the cloud, it will be 
managed by the cloud provider, and the organization can continue doing its business as 
usual. In contrast, when an organizations' on-premises hardware fails, it will cost a lot of 
money. In the cloud, running costs will be much smaller than on-premises. Dedicated on-
premises servers are still expensive, and they often need more than a one-time expense 
such as maintenance and updates cost. An incredibly significant benefit of cloud-cost 
savings can be seen in data center construction and infrastructure. Additionally, there is a 
need for ancillary services equipment to support on-premises servers like a switch, rack, 
cooling fans, which will increase the cost. This means that operating costs will reduce 
significantly in the cloud rather than run on-premises. 
2.2 Identity and Access Management (IAM) 
Identity and Access Management systems are used to enhance their ability to protect 
confidential data stored in the cloud and to provide further protection to confidential 
information stored in the cloud. IAM provides the sorts of reliability and usability of 
customer access control imperative to any organization's sites these days. How an 
organization decides to implement IAM in its cloud environment will depend on its 
requirements. The IAM framework's primary functions are to ensure that users who 
access enterprise resources are who they say they are and identify and monitor user, 
device, or service, access rights (Indu, I., Anand, P. R., & Bhaskar, V. 2018) . The vital 
IAM concepts are access and user. 
2.2.1 IAM Processes in a Cloud Computing Environment 
In a cloud computing environment, the general processes of adding, modifying, or 
removing a user remain unchanged compared to the traditional IT environment. Users 
must be added, modified, or removed from a system before accessing its authorized 
resources. IAM in the traditional model is handled, managed, and regulated within the 
on-premises by the organization. Local authentication allows users to access local 
services such as data and applications (Jansen, W., & Grance, T. 2011). 
The organization that uses cloud services is often not responsible for authentication 
management. The majority of authentication occurs in the cloud. For users to access 
cloud services, most cloud service providers use their authentication mechanism. In a 
cloud computing environment, the organization that uses the services determines which 
resources the users can access. When the organization uses cloud services, both cloud 
service providers and the organizations that use cloud services have different 
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authorization models. Furthermore, the organization that uses the cloud services does not 
have the control to enforce its security policies for cloud service providers' services 
because the cloud service providers oversee access to their services. 
 
Figure 2 IAM for Cloud Services 
2.3 Cloud Identity Management Models 
Because cloud computing is becoming more prevalent in the IT industry, secure identity 
management is becoming increasingly important (Zwattendorfer, B., Zefferer, T., & 
Stranacher, K. 2014). In a cloud computing environment, there are many several for 
managing identities and access. The identity can be delivered from the cloud, it can be 
taken to the cloud, or it can be stored in the cloud (Zwattendorfer, B., Zefferer, T., & 
Stranacher, K. 2014). 
1. Identity in the Cloud-Model: Identity management is the cloud service provider's 
responsibility that hosts the application. In this model, organizations can rely on an 
existing identity management system, managed by the cloud service provider, rather than 
hosting and managing their own. When using this model, an organization's expenses can 
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be minimized. The organization loses control over the identity data stored and handled in 
the cloud when this model is used, and the cloud service provider assumes responsibility 
for security and privacy. 
2. Identity to the Cloud-Model: The key distinction of this model is that the service 
provider and its applications are hosted in the cloud. This model prevents unnecessary 
identity data disclosure to a cloud service provider because the identity provider is not 
deployed in the cloud. The organization continues to host the entire user and identity 
management. 
3. Identity from the Cloud-Model: Both the cloud application and the identity 
provider are hosted in this model's cloud. The separation of cloud service providers is an 
advantage of this model. Organizations in this model can choose their preferred cloud 
identity provider. This is especially important because the identity provider responsible 
for the organization's identity and user management must be trusted. 
4. The Cloud Identity Broker-Model: The cloud identity broker links one or more 
services with one or more identity providers. Using the broker concept, the identity 
broker conceals the ambiguity of the service provider's individual identity providers. This 
means that only one interface is required, which is required for the identity broker. This 
model is even more effective when the broker is deployed in the cloud. One downside is 
that the cloud identity broker's functionality is based on both the user and the service 
provider. The service provider would be unable to offer its services to the user if the 
identity broker does not accept the chosen identity provider for authentication. 
5. The Federated Cloud Identity Broker-Model: Users and service providers do not 
have to rely on the exact identity broker in this federated model. Both the user and the 
service provider can depend on their preferred individual broker. This removes the 





Figure 3 A Federated Cloud Identity Broker-Model (Bernd Zwattendorfer , 2016) 
2.4. Access Risks in Cloud Security 
Regardless of whether it is a service based on a private cloud, public cloud, or a hybrid 
cloud, the importance of user access control is a nearly constant challenge. When using 
cloud computing, organizations should recognize that their sensitive information will be 
shared with a third-party cloud computing provider. Various security mechanisms are 
currently used to alleviate the problems in the cloud. Access management, in general, 
includes three capabilities: the ability to define and authenticate users, grant users access 
rights, and develop and implement access control policies. Multi Factor authentication 
can help mitigate the risk of credential compromise, as compromised privileged user 
credentials give an attacker the ability to access and customize cloud customer services. 
By requiring an attacker to obtain several, independent authentication components, 
multiple factors reduce the probability of a compromise. 
 
2.5. Literature Review 
Research performed by previous scholars helps current researchers a lot because it allows 
them to avoid making the same mistakes. A literature review examines published 
research in a specific subject area to provide an overview of current knowledge. 
Additionally, literature reviews help to advance the research's cause by examining its 
significance from the perspective of well-known scholars. Therefore, tens of thousands of 
books, articles, and studies have been published on the topic. In this chapter, the thesis 
will concentrate on the research work done by other well-known experts and writers and 
attempt to provide some robust solutions to this issue. 
In the NIST definition of cloud computing paper, Peter Mell and Timothy Grance (2011) 
defined the service and deployment models and discussed what cloud computing is to 
best use cloud computing. It is an evident fact that the definition has provided a brief 
introduction of the service and deployment models in cloud computing that can be useful 
for a person who does not know much about cloud computing. The authors made a 
simple taxonomy that is not intended to prescribe or constrain any specific deployment 
method, service delivery, or business activity. 
Vaishali H Pardeshia (2014) proposed a cloud computing architecture for a higher 
education institution that includes multiple deployment models, service models, and user 
domains. He presented a five-phase strategy to facilitate the migration from traditional IT 
to a cloud computing environment and provided suggestions for a smooth and effective 
transition from a traditional system to a cloud-based system. 
A University's management needs to be assured of the benefits, challenges, and cost of 
adopting a federated identity technology before they invest. As a starting point, we 
wanted to identify the benefits of deploying federated identity management in scientific 
literature. the benefits of adopting federated identity management systems from a user 
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and business perspective and a high-level view on adopting federated identity 
management in an integrated operations environment. The use of Federated Identity 
Management, according to several studies, will improve the ability to protect personal 
privacy. Moreover, because of the reduced number of authentication operations, users 
would choose different and better passwords from their Identity Providers. Federated 
Identity Management has the potential to enhance user protection. In federated identity 
management systems, users are relieved from memorizing multiple passwords. With 
federated identity management systems, users will benefit from increased simplicity 
because federated identity solutions can reduce complexity. Additionally, improved user 
experience is accomplished by seamless access to services and the removal of redundant 
user login processes. According to Jostein Jensen the user and business benefits of 
adopting Federated Identity Management systems and a high-level view of implementing 
Federated Identity Management in an Integrated Operations environment. 
In potential market situations, Gail-Joon Ahn and John Lam discussed FIM privacy 
concerns. they suggested systematic mechanisms to specify privacy preferences in FIM 
and introduced a user preference expression language that is essential to managing users 
in FIM (Ahn, G. J., & Lam, J. 2005). Without any doubt, federated identity 
management's critical concerns are information security and privacy, as identity 
federation requires sharing confidential user information over an insecure and open 
network. 
From A Survey on Security Issues of Federated Identity in the Cloud Computing by 
Eghbal Ghazizadeh et al (2012). They believe that by establishing the proper trust 
relationship among participating federated entities, infrastructure components, and cloud 
platforms, Trusted Computing can reinforce existing security solutions. They addressed 
federated identity management systems, cloud computing, single sign-on, and SSO 
protocols like OpenID and OAuth and highlighted the introduced models for addressing 
identity theft in a federated environment. The aim of this paper was to demonstrate how 
trusted computing technologies can dramatically reduce phishing attacks on cloud-based 
user assets (Ghazizadeh, E., Zamani, M., & Pashang, A. 2012). 
Vahid Jalili and others (2019) have established a generic and extensible approach for 
securely accessing biomedical datasets spread through cloud computing platforms. This 
approach combines OpenID Connect and OAuth2, which are best-practice web protocols 
for authentication and authorization, with a web-based computational workbench that is 
used by thousands of scientists worldwide called Galaxy. This approach allows users to 
access and analyze data spread through various cloud computing providers without 




Figure 4 Cloud bursting galaxy federated identity. Vahid Jalili and others (2019) 
 Federated Identity Management in the Norwegian Oil and Gas Industry by Jostein 
Jensen (2014), has offered a brief introduction to all mandatory terminology that can help 
anyone unfamiliar with federated identity management. He performed a study of 
companies engaged in developing oil and gas in Norway to ascertain their perceptions of 
the potential advantages, threats, and additional security risks associated with the 
adoption of federated identity management. He indicated that a strong emphasis on 
security is needed across the software development lifecycle when designing identity 
management solutions. He has documented various access management issues facing the 
industry and has outlined the benefits and problems of federated identity management 
from both an academic and a business perspective. 
Some authors (2012), who are interested in federated identity management for their 
research cyberinfrastructure, demand that user bases be expanded through diverse 
alliances to overcome the challenge of getting access to scientific data across 
organizational and national boundaries. Motivated by these needs, they established an 
active community called FIM4R. FIM4R consists of communities and infrastructures 









Chapter 3 Federated identity 
3.1 Introduction to Federated Identity 
Federated identity management is a critical component of digital identity management 
(Madsen, P., Koga, Y., & Takahashi, K. 2005). Federated Identity management is 
primarily motivated by the need to improve user experience and privacy (Ahn, G. J., & 
Lam, J. 2005). Federated Identity management will simplify the user management 
process (Ahn, G. J., & Lam, J. 2005). The main goal of federated identity management is 
to address how to leverage organizations' identity management operations to allow 
partners and customers direct access to their applications. Federated identity refers to the 
collaborative and interdependent management of identity information across 
organizations. The federation model allows users from one domain to securely access 
resources from another domain without having to go through several login processes. 
Federated identity management removes the need for users to have an account in the 
organization directory; instead, they can access services by logging in once to their 
identity provider. Eve Maler and Drummond Reed (2016) presented four logical 
components to the federated model: the user, the user agent, the service provider, the 
identity provider (Maler, E., & Reed, D. 2008). 
 
Figure 5 Federated and Non-Federated Identity (Temoshok and Abruzzi, 2018) 
3.1.2.The CIA Triad in Federated Identity 
The CIA Triad(Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability) is considered the foundation of 
information security. Confidentiality is based on the ability to identify and implement 
clear access thresholds for information. People must protect their confidential, private 
information from unauthorized access in today's world. Access control lists, volume and 
file encryption, and Unix file permissions are among the most popular methods for 
maintaining confidentiality. In contrast, integrity is intended to protect data from 
unwanted deletion or alteration. When an approved individual makes a change that 
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should not have been made, integrity means that the damage can be undone. While 
availability is to protect information and make it accessible when needed, authentication 
processes, access networks, and systems must function correctly. 
In the federated identity model, Confidentiality is reinforced as follows: third parties do 
not have plaintext access to user credentials or attributes and will never be able to access 
decryption keys. A malicious man-in-the-middle attack would not violate the 
authenticated user's data, and it is impossible to gain unauthorized access to transactional 
data. In contrast, integrity is reinforced as follows: the relying party has the assurance that 
the data has not been altered by the hub or a malicious third party. The relying party is 
confident that the data is being provided by a valid credential service provider and 
guaranteed that a malicious third party would not impersonate a legitimate user and reuse 
previously valid assertions (Grassi, P., Lefkovitz, N., & Mangold, K. 2016). 
3.2.Trust Relationships in Federated Identity Management 
A foundation of trust is needed in a federated business model. A federated model is one 
in which an organization can grant access to an identity that its internal security 
mechanisms have not vetted. The organization trusts an identity claimed by a third party. 
If an organization does not have insight into its business partners' identity and access 
management systems and processes, it cannot participate in a federated business model. 
Trust among members of an identity federation is essential to its operation and is defined 
through a collection of agreements and associated rules unique to that group. Identity 
federations are made up of credential service providers (CSPs) and relying parties (RP) 
that have agreed to engage in a particular form of federated identity management. Users 
are registered, passwords are established, users are authenticated, and federation RPs are 
informed of their authentication status by CSPs. RPs use the authentication status 
information to approve user access to online services and applications based on identity 
assertions supported by CSPs. According to David Temoshok and Christine Abruzzi, "a 
trust framework is the set of rules and policies that govern how the federation members 




Figure 6 Trust relationships in federated identity management. 
3.3.Privacy in Federated Identity Management 
When it comes to cloud computing, one of the most important issues is privacy. In terms 
of managing privacy, protecting data, and adhering to legislation, sharing personally 
identifiable information is a significant concern. Federated identity management raises 
new privacy concerns. Although features such as pseudonymous authentication and 
limited attribute release can help increase privacy, federated identity management can 
also increase privacy risks for various reasons. NIST Cybersecurity Practice Guide 
describes the practical steps required to execute an example solution that addresses 
current challenges in the federated identity market. An identity ecosystem of federated 
identity solutions can play a pivotal role in achieving a more secure cyberspace. The 
federation prevents relying party service and identity providers from learning the 
identities of each other. Other than what is known from their direct relationship with the 
user, both entities cannot monitor and connect user behaviors (Laszewski, T., & Nauduri, 
P. 2010).  
According to Paul Grassi and Naomi Lefkovitz (2016), although the identity broker may 
raise individual privacy risks, Privacy-enhancing technologies built into hardware or 
software eliminate adverse effects on individuals when their personal information is 
being collected or processed. They presented a set of goals that represent a 
comprehensive set of privacy goals that federated identity solutions may achieve based 
on requirements and demand. The following are explanations of each of these goals 
(Grassi, P., Lefkovitz, N., & Mangold, K. 2016). 
Goal 1: The federation prohibits RPs and CSPs from discovering each other's identities. 
Neither entity may monitor or connect user activities beyond what is learned from their 
direct relationship with the user. 
Goal 2: Participants in the federation, other than those the user approves, cannot access 
user attributes. Users must first agree to share the attribute from the CSP to the RP. Then, 
Validated attributes are obtained by RPs from authoritative CSPs. When the RP has the 
actual attribute value, they will use it to meet their service requirements. 
Goal 3: A compromised, or malicious federation participant cannot impersonate a user. 
To reduce this threat, controls must be put in place. 
Goal 4: Attributes are only provided when requested by an RP, not every time a user logs 
in to use RP services. RPs will only collect the attributes required by the services a user is 
requesting to satisfy the user's services. 
Goal 5: Users must explicitly consent to the disclosure of their attributes to an RP. 
Goal 6: User pseudonyms cannot be tracked or linked through transactions by entities 
that mediate identity transactions. For maintaining privacy, especially when multiple 
Web services collaborate to provide an aggregated product that necessitates the sharing of 
user attributes, pseudonyms are an essential technique. 
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To facilitate the development and operation of privacy-preserving information systems, 
NIST (2016) has developed three draft privacy engineering objectives. These objectives 
are intended to assist system designers and developers in developing information systems 
capable of achieving their practical objectives while also supporting an organization's 
privacy priorities and risk management (Grassi, P., Lefkovitz, N., & Mangold, K. 2016). 
These privacy objectives are Predictability, Manageability, and  Disassociability. 
Predictability is the capacity for individuals, owners, and operators to make accurate 
decisions about personal information and its processing by an information system. 
Manageability is the capacity to administer personal information granularly, including its 
modification, deletion, and selective disclosure. 
Disassociability refers to a system's ability to handle personal data or events without 
associating them with specific persons or devices outside the system's operational 
requirements. 
3.4.Common Technology in Federated Identity 
Several identity management technologies have already appeared over time. Four popular 
federated identity protocols. The following technologies are widely used in federated 
identity management: 
1. Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML): SAML is a federated 
authentication protocol. It is most often used to allow users to sign into multiple 
applications using a single login. In other words, SAML is an XML-based 
standard for sharing authentication and authorization data between identity 
providers and service providers to verify the user's identity and permissions 
before granting or denying access to services. Moreover, SAML is a relatively 
heavyweight protocol due to the scale of the XML messages sent to and from the 
SP and IDP. 
2. OAuth: OAuth is a protocol for authorization that decides what that user should 
be allowed to do. In other words, OAuth is a security standard that enables users 
to grant permission to one application to access their data stored in another 
application. The OAuth 2.0 allows clients to retrieve user profile information 
without information about the end user's authentication. Without providing their 
password, the users authorize one application to access their data. OAuth is not a 
single sign-on protocol; it lacks default digital signatures and encryptions, making 
it vulnerable to various security threats and data access breaches. Permission-
granting procedures are sometimes referred to as delegated authorization. So, in 
OAuth, authorization is delegated. A variation of the OIDC and OAuth2 protocols 
can be used for various authentication purposes, including machine-to-machine 
and device-to-device authentication. 
3. OpenID: OpenID is a protocol for authentication that ensures that the user you are 
talking to is indeed who he claims to be. Although OpenID 2.0 had some useful 
security features, it was restricted to web applications and had several other 
design limitations, such as dependency on XML and custom message signatures, 
which contributed to adoption difficulties. 
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4. The InfoCard protocol is only compatible with the WS-* Web service protocols, 
which means that WS-Trust serves as the foundation for InfoCard. The InfoCard 
protocol is a credential exchange protocol created to provide users with a 
consistent digital identity experience using a specialized user agent[19]. 
 
 
Figure 7. The differences between SAML, OpenID, and The InfoCard. (Eve Maler and 
Drummond Reed, 2008) 
3.6.The OAuth 2.0 Framework 
3.6.1.OAuth 2.0 Roles 
OAuth 2.0 Framework defines four roles as follows: 
Resource Owner: The user owns his or her identity, records, and any acts that can be 
taken with his or her accounts. 
Client: The application that wants to access the Resource Owner's data or perform actions 
on his or her behalf. 
Authorization Server: The application that is used to apply access policies and allows 
access to the data on the Resource Server on behalf of the Resource Owner where the 
Resource Owner already owns an account. 
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Resource Server: The service requested by the Client on behalf of the Resource Owner. 
The Resource Server and Authorization Server may be implemented in the same server 
entity or a separate one (Lodderstedt, T., McGloin, M., & Hunt, P. 2013). 
  
Figure 8 OAuth Roles. 
3.6.2.Authorization Grant 
An authorization grant is a credential that the client uses to obtain an access token. It 
represents the resource owner's authorization. According to Hardt, D. (2012), there are 
four grant types of an authorization grant as follows: (Hardt, D. 2012). 
1. The authorization code is obtained by using an authorization server, which serves 
as a middleman between the client and the resource owner. 
2. The implicit grant is a streamlined authorization code flow designed for clients 
implemented using a scripting language such as JavaScript in a browser. 
3. The resource owner's password credentials can be used immediately as an 
authentication grant to gain an access token. 
4. The client's credentials may be used as an authorization grant when the 





Figure 9 Protocol Flow 
 
 
3.7.Security Features on The OAuth2.0 Framework 
According to Lodderstedt et al. (2013), there are some of the security features built into 
the OAuth 2.0 protocol to reduce attacks and security issues (Lodderstedt, T., McGloin, 
M., & Hunt, P. 2013). Tokens such as access tokens, refresh tokens, and authorization 
codes are used extensively in OAuth. Scope represents the access authorization 
associated with a token in terms of resource servers, resources, and methods on those 
resources. The scope is the OAuth framework for handling the power associated with an 
access token directly. A limited Access Token Lifetime is responsible for limiting the 
lifetime of an access token and passing this information to the client. 
A client uses an access token to gain access to a resource. Because access tokens have 
short life spans a refresh token allows a specific client to access resources on behalf of 
the resource owner for an extended period. The client uses an authorization "code" to 
receive access and refresh tokens. While a redirect URI helps identify malicious clients 
and avoid phishing attacks from clients trying to trick the user into thinking the phisher is 
the client, the "state" parameter is used to link requests and callbacks to prevent cross-site 
request forgery attacks and Client Identifier to increase the level of protection in 








4.1.The Proposed Approach 
After studying several studies about Federated Identity Management and its technology, 
it would be easier to present the proposed approach that provides access to academic 
libraries quickly and securely. In our approach in this thesis, we will use Federated Cloud 
Identity Broker-Model. This cloud identity management model relies on a federated 
approach that provides the opportunity to use multiple cloud identity brokers to 
communicate with each other. In this model, users and service providers can authenticate 
using their preferred cloud identity broker. The user maintains total control over which 
data is exchanged with the service provider and cloud identity broker and can choose how 
much information to share with the service provider and cloud identity broker 
(Zwattendorfer, B., Slamanig, D., Stranacher, K., & Hörandner, F. 2014). 
Depending on our use case in this thesis we will use OAuth and OIDC protocols for 
authentication and authorization. A third-party application can obtain limited access to an 
HTTP service using the OAuth 2.0 authorization framework (Lodderstedt, T., McGloin, 
M., & Hunt, P. (2013). The client obtains an access token instead of using the resource 
owner’s credentials to access protected resources. The OpenID Connect (OIDC) identity 
layer is developed on top of the OAuth 2.0 framework to enable third-party applications 
to verify the end-identity users and obtain simple user profile information. OIDC obtains 
conforming to the OAuth 2.0 specifications by using JSON web tokens (JWTs). JSON 
Web Token (JWT) is represented using the JWS compact serialization and intended for 
space-constrained environments. JSON Web Token (JWT) enables the claims to be 
transferred between two parties and be digitally signed and encrypted. The goal of OIDC 
is to provide users with one log-in for multiple applications. 
This approach enables users to login using their identities with a wide range of identity 
providers, and it leverages CloudAuthz to obtain authorization to cloud-based resource 
providers, such as AWS, Azure, and Google Cloud Platform. Users can access academic 
resources across multiple cloud computing platforms using best practice Web security 
approaches, thereby minimizing unauthorized data access and credential use risks. 
This approach utilizes the authorization code flow of the OIDC protocol to authorize and 
authenticate a user. First, a user's identity is verified by an Identity Provider. After that, 
realm (B) receives security tokens from the Identity Provider. The security contains 
claims about the user's authentication and authorization. There is a two-step procedure for 
accomplishing this flow, as detailed below: 
A. The administrator of realm (B) sets up the realm for the authorization code flow 
by registering it with the identity provider and obtaining security credentials for realm 
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(B) and using these credentials to ensure the authenticity of communications between the 
parties. 
B. A realm (A) authenticates a user via sending a request to the Identity Provider. 
The request includes Security tokens, Redirect URL, Anti-forgery claims. 
After successful authentication, an Identity Provider forwards to the realm an 
authorization code and the state token (B). Then, the realm (B) uses the state token to 
validate the redirect message's authenticity and associate the authorization code with a 
user of the realm (B). The realm (B) then exchanges the authorization code for an ID 
token and a refresh token from the Identity Provider. Each resource provider has an 
established method for authorizing a client to assume a role. 
In This approach, the OIDC protocol is used to federate users' identity and authentication. 
Using a temporary identity token, an identity provider authenticates a user to the realm 
(B) in this model. The realm (A) then uses this token to obtain cloud-native credentials 
and access protected resources through the resource provider's API. The realm (A) 
automatically refreshes the token as a trusted party to continue operating on the user’s 
behalf beyond the validity of the initial token. 
 
4.2.The Advantages of Proposed Approach 
Individuals gain control over the use and sharing their identity attributes within the 
federation through federated identity management systems (Jensen, J. 2011). By 
federating users' identities across several security domains, the user can authenticate to 
one domain and then access resources in the other domain without authenticating again. 
Users' security can improve because of federated identities. Additionally, reducing and 
strengthening authentication operations would also reduce the risk of identity theft 
(Madsen, P., Koga, Y., & Takahashi, K. 2005).  
It is easier for an IT administrator to handle fewer user identities across multiple 
applications. The many methods used for federated login allow the user to have only one 
login credentials set, minimizing the amount of administrative effort needed. There 
would be no need to deal with new users' problems. It will be just about giving secure 
access. Moreover, there is no longer a need to handle users or identities that are not under 
their control individually, significantly lowering the cost of identity life cycle 
management. Having several login credentials opens to several security risks. In such a 
situation, federated login allows organizations to resolve this difficulty while also 
mitigating security risks. Federated identity solutions make several security features 
easier to implement. 
Most websites with a registration mechanism discover that some of the users who begin 
the process never complete it. As websites request additional information, the percentage 
of registration success drops even more. A federated login mechanism increases success 
rates by automating most of the access process and eliminating users' need to recall a 
website password which provides a seamless and trusted user interface with a single 
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registration and sign-on so that users can conveniently navigate between Web pages 
using a single identity and monitor the release of their data directly. Reduce identity and 
security protection costs by linking and reusing identities through organizations. There is 
no longer the need for duplicating data to share the academic resources among the 
researcher community. 
Students have become accustomed to requiring an ever-increasing number of identities to 
complete their daily academic tasks. Users want to connect their identities once to prove 
ownership and then be allowed to perform actions using this set of identities (Kushida, K. 
E., Murray, J., & Zysman, J. 2015). Allowing students to access other universities' 
resources and learn about new teaching methods will help improve teaching in 
universities that do not have good learning resources. Some universities have bilateral 
agreements with search engines to provide more research resources to their students, 
improving their research quality. If this service is shared, it will help universities with 





















Chapter 5  
5.1.Conclusion 
Academic collaboration has immense potential to improve the research and teaching 
qualities of universities. By collaborating, the researchers can share research data, 
documents, experimental testbeds, high-end computing equipment, etc., and can solve 
complex problems which cannot be solved by a single investigator’s efforts. Despite its 
immense potential and fundamental dependency, collaboration across universities is 
extremely challenging due to underlying trust issues. In addition, the collaborating 
entities face the difficulty of creating a new identity for each new collaboration they sign-
up for. To mitigate these current limitations, in this thesis, we proposed Federated 
Identity Management (FIM) approach for facilitating secure resource sharing among 
collaborating associates without creating new identities. In the first part of the thesis, we 
provided a comprehensive literature survey of identity and access management and 
discussed the privacy issues associated with identity management that can be addressed 
using FIM. The users and service providers in FIM have the advantage to be 
authenticated using their preferred cloud identity broker which is a unique feature not 
available in the traditional IAM model. This additional feature in FIM reduces the cost of 
user management as well as makes the security integration and user experience seamless. 
Although the identity broker may raise individual privacy risks, an identity ecosystem of 
federated identity solutions can play a pivotal role in achieving more secure cyberspace 
by preventing identity providers from collecting information about users' identities. The 
second part of the thesis provides the comprehensive overview and security features of 
the OAuth 2.0 framework which is an industry-standard protocol for authorization and 
user management used by FIM. We also enumerated all the critical implementation steps 
and detailed design of the proposed framework. Our future work will involve additional 
methods, such as case studies at organizations using federated identity management and 
interviews with users who extensively use it. We believe that such case studies would 
undoubtedly reveal salient requirements and contributed to a better framework design.  
5.2.Future Research 
The cloud provides several benefits to reduced costs and time to deliver solutions and 
share data. Federated identity is a maturing part of this revolution. This research only 
takes the universities that use cloud services into account and focuses on federated 
identity as an essential factor for collaboration between universities on cloud computing. 
The proposed approach can be generalized for collaboration to allow university and 
school systems to provide central shared services worldwide and establish partnerships 
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that allow students from other partner universities to enroll in courses and log in to their 
campus learning system. More research should be done to develop better use of federated 
identity models for university cooperation. Cloud service providers must attempt to 























[1] Mell, P., & Grance, T. (2011). The NIST definition of cloud computing. 
[2] Dillon, T., Wu, C., & Chang, E. (2010, April). Cloud computing: issues and 
challenges. In 2010 24th IEEE international conference on advanced information 
networking and applications (pp. 27-33). Ieee. 
[3] Vaquero, L. M., Rodero-Merino, L., Caceres, J., & Lindner, M. (2008). A break in the 
clouds: towards a cloud definition. 
[4] Kushida, K. E., Murray, J., & Zysman, J. (2015). Cloud computing: From scarcity to 
abundance. Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 15(1), 5-19. 
[5] Singh, A., & Chatterjee, K. (2017). Cloud security issues and challenges: A survey. 
Journal of Network and Computer Applications, 79, 88-115. 
[6] Dotson, C. (2019). Practical Cloud Security: A Guide for Secure Design and 
Deployment. O'Reilly Media. 
[7] Hardt, D. (2012). The OAuth 2.0 authorization framework. 
[8] Indu, I., Anand, P. R., & Bhaskar, V. (2018). Identity and access management in 
cloud environment: Mechanisms and challenges. Engineering science and technology, an 
international journal, 21(4), 574-588. 
[9] Zwattendorfer, B., Zefferer, T., & Stranacher, K. (2014, April). An Overview of 
Cloud Identity Management-Models. In WEBIST (1) (pp. 82-92). 
[10] Jansen, W., & Grance, T. (2011). Sp 800-144. guidelines on security and privacy in 
public cloud computing. 
[11] Hörbe, R., & Hötzendorfer, W. (2015, May). Privacy by design in federated identity 
management. In 2015 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (pp. 167-174). IEEE. 
[12] Jensen, J. (2014). Federated Identity Management in the Norwegian Oil and Gas 
Industry. 
[13] Partners, L. C. S. Cloud Federation and Federated Access Control. 
[14] Jensen, J. (2011, August). Benefits of federated identity management-A survey from 
an integrated operations viewpoint. In International Conference on Availability, 
Reliability, and Security (pp. 1-12). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. 
[15] Laszewski, T., & Nauduri, P. (2010). Migrating to cloud. Waltham, USA, Elsevier. 
UNDP (2012), World Population Prospects: The. 
27 
 
[16] Indu, I., Anand, P. R., & Bhaskar, V. (2018). Identity and access management in 
cloud environment: Mechanisms and challenges. Engineering science and technology, an 
international journal, 21(4), 574-588. 
[17] Bulusu, S., & Sudia, K. (2013). A study on cloud computing security challenges. 
[18] Grassi, P., Lefkovitz, N., & Mangold, K. (2016). PRIVACY-ENHANCED 
IDENTITY FEDERATION. 
[19] Maler, E., & Reed, D. (2008). The venn of identity: Options and issues in federated 
identity management. IEEE security & privacy, 6(2), 16-23. 
[20] Jalili, V., Afgan, E., Taylor, J., & Goecks, J. (2020). Cloud bursting Galaxy: 
federated identity and access management. Bioinformatics, 36(1), 1-9. 
[21] Ahn, G. J., & Lam, J. (2005, November). Managing privacy preferences for 
federated identity management. In Proceedings of the 2005 workshop on Digital identity 
management (pp. 28-36). 
[22] Pardeshi, V. H. (2014). Cloud computing for higher education institutes: 
architecture, strategy and recommendations for effective adaptation. Procedia Economics 
and Finance, 11, 589-599. 
[23] Ahn, G. J., & Lam, J. (2005, November). Managing privacy preferences for 
federated identity management. In Proceedings of the 2005 workshop on Digital identity 
management (pp. 28-36). 
[24] Ghazizadeh, E., Zamani, M., & Pashang, A. (2012, December). A survey on security issues 
of federated identity in the cloud computing. In 4th IEEE International Conference on Cloud 
Computing Technology and Science Proceedings (pp. 532-565). IEEE. 
[25] Madsen, P., Koga, Y., & Takahashi, K. (2005, November). Federated identity 
management for protecting users from ID theft. In Proceedings of the 2005 workshop on 
Digital identity management (pp. 77-83). 
[26] Ahmed, M., & Petrova, K. (2020). A Zero-Trust Federated Identity and Access 
Management Framework for Cloud and Cloud-based Computing Environments. 
[27] Temoshok, D., Temoshok, D., & Abruzzi, C. (2018). Developing Trust Frameworks 
to Support Identity Federations. US Department of Commerce, National Institute of 
Standards and Technology. 
[28] Broeder, D., Wartel, R., Jones, B., Kershaw, P., Kelsey, D., Lüders, S., ... & Weyer, 
H. J. (2012). Federated identity management for research collaborations (No. CERN-
OPEN-2012-006). 
[29] Zwattendorfer, B., Slamanig, D., Stranacher, K., & Hörandner, F. (2014, 
September). A federated cloud identity broker-model for enhanced privacy via proxy re-
encryption. In IFIP International Conference on Communications and Multimedia 
Security (pp. 92-103). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. 
[30] Lodderstedt, T., McGloin, M., & Hunt, P. (2013). OAuth 2.0 threat model and 
security considerations. IETF2013. 
